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NOTES
THE USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT CRIME.
CASES INVOLVING PURPRESTURES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH, SAFETY AND COMFORT.*
INTRODUOTION
It is well established law that courts of equity will not enjoin
criminal acts as such. Tns has been recognized and is undis-
puted, as shown in another section of this study Today many
injunctions issue to prevent crime under the giuse of protecting
a property right in cases of public nuisances. This paper will
treat the growth of the use of the injunction in public nuisance
cases, which are crimes, in purprestures and public health, safety
and comfort.
All purprestures that are public nuisances, and all breaches
of the common law and statutory laws that are public nuisances
are criminal acts, and if equity enjoins in such cases, its juris-
diction is essentially criminal. It will be shown that equity has
assumed jurisdiction in criminal cases by the indirect method
of enjoining public nuisances iii the protection of public health,
safety and comfort.1
* This is the fourth of a aeries of notes on the use of the Injunc-
tion to Prevent Crime.
The following citations are helpful in a study of this problem:
The Progress of the Law, Equitable Relief Against Torts, Chafee,
34 Har. L. Rev. 388, 407 et seq.
Principles of Equity, Clark, See. 244.
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), See. 1890 and 1941.
Walsh on Equity, pp. 197-202.
16 Harvard Law Review 389, "Revival of Criminal Equity," Mack.
15 U. of Pa. Law Review-Chafee's, Does Equity Follow the Law
of Torts.
Durfee on Equity, p. 592.
Chafee's, Cases of Equitable Relief Against Torts, 438.
28 Michigan Law Review 440-The Last Step in Criminal Equity.
31 Harvard Law Rev. 857-Some Aspects of 15th Century Chancery
-Barbour.
Primitive Society and Ancient Law-Maines on Ancient Law 113.
21 Columbia Law Review 680-Title to Land Under Navigable
Waters, Joseph B. Thompson.
Historical Jurisdiction, Vol. I, Vinogradoff.
1The term "public nuisance" applies only to something occasioned
by acts done in violation of the law. 2 Green (N. J.) 75.
USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT CRIME
Courts of equity have long refused to take jurisdiction where
there is no property right to be protected.2 Many fictions have
become embedded in the law because the courts have gone out
of their way to find a property right on which to base thehr
decisions. 3 If, then, equity jurisdiction is based on a property
right, what property right of the state is protected when equity
assumes jurisdiction to enjoin public nuisances that are also
crnminal?
I. PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LANDS AND
SUBJECTS.
To answer this question we must look to early history There
are many theories of government, but research has established
that the Aryan culture came early to England through the Celts
and today many of the customs are preserved in Welsh Laws and
Brehon Tracts of Ireland, also shown by the clans of the Scot-
tish Highlands. 4 Aryan culture was based on the patriarchal
system which was a growth of the family with the father as
despotic head. The father owned all the land and members of
the family Several of the more eminent authorities of early
jurisprudence and early history agree that he bad power of
life and death, to sell, and to give in marriage over his children.5
"Marriage was by capture or purchase, causing the wife to be
regarded as the husband's chattel.' '6 "The wife is the hus-
band's property and, therefore, her offspring must be in his
power too."
7
The family grew into the tribe and the father, now called
the patriarch, retained his despotic power. By conquest or by
the joining of weaker tribes to stronger tribes for protec-
tion, the state came into existence. The early state retained the
patriarchal system only in a less degree. The power of the
father (patria protestas) in the Roman family is well known.
According to Games it was an unbending absolute rule, in that
the f:ather could even put his son to death. His power over
property was equally unlimited. The power of the father is
2 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402.
s Pound 29 H. L. R. 640.
'"Historical Jurisprudence," Vinogradoff, Vol. I, P. 230.
History of Ancient Law, Maines, p. 138.
Kohler.
1 Kovalevsky.
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equally well known in English law in that he was allowed an
action of trespass if the wife or children were taken.8 Another
primitive custom of the patriarchal system known to English
laws was the hand fast marriages which were protected as late
as 1509. 9
Blackstone said that the common law of his time totally
disregarded the loss sustained by the inferior party to the family
relation because the father had the property right in all the
inferiors.10
The patriarchal system of government in its early stages
shows the ruler was first the father of the family and tribe with,
full ownership of all property and members. Then as states
and empires were founded this same patriarch became king with
ownership of his subjects and property
The subject must be protected from violence and his health
and comfort assured as they are necessary to his fitness to fight
for the King.
Advancing civilization changed many things, among which
were the recognition of the rights of the people and the dwin-
dling of the King's ownership and power. The idea of the
King's ownership of all public lands and his property in s
subjects has prevailed and today traces are seen when it is said,
"the state may go into equity not only as a property holder but
also as a representative or guardian of the health and wealth
and general interests of its citizens", or as Chafee says "as
parens patri--guardian of the peoples welfare' 12 A yet
broader view given by Pomeroy is, 'as a public nuisance concerns
the public generally, it is the duty of the government to take
measures to abate or enjoin it. Hence, it follows that the gov-
ernment can obtain an injunction to restrain a public nuisance
without showing a property right in itself. The duty of pro-
tecting the property rights of all its citizens is sufficient to war-
rant issuing the injunction" 13 The latter is the United States
8Fitzherbert Nat. Brev. 890 and 90 H.
9 The Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland, Sir
Robert Gordon, p. 95.
1" 3 Bi. Com. 142, 143.
2113 California Law Review 63.
22 34 Harvard Law Review 395.
" 5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition, p. 4296.
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rule and rightly such, because in a Republican form of Govern-
ment the public property is in the people and not the Crown.
Now that we have found a property right in the government
in its public lands and subjects upon which to base equity juris-
diction, we next turn to the problem of seeing how far it has
gone toward prevention of crime by the use of the injunction in
public nuisance cases.
II. BASIS OF EQUITY JUISDICTION IN P17RPRESTUE CAMSES.
The property right of the state in public lands and navi-
galble waters is well established. It seems as though the Crown
never fully relinquished the old right of Patria Protestas to these
lands and, although there is conflict as to its proprietory rights,
there is no argument as to the rights it holds for the public use.
Consequently, there is little trouble in establishing equity juris-
diction in these cases, because such jurisdiction is based upon
this property right in the state.
One line of cases based upon the Philpot Case, 14 expressly
states that the Crown has a proprietory rignt in the navigable
waters, owns all land between high and low water mark and
cxercises rights both jus privatum and jus publicum. These
cases hold that any purpresture, any encroachment upon public
water ways or highways, is subject to abatement in equity at the
suit of the State whether it is a nuisance or not. This is not the
weight of authority in either England or the United States. 15
However, flinois,1 6 South Carolina 7 and one Federal case1 8
support this view.
The other view is that the Crown or State does not own as
jus privatum but only as jus publicum and can enjoin a pur-
presture only in case it is a public nuisance. L9 This seems to be
the weight of authority and is upheld by writers of texts20 and
other authorities. 21 The above view is erroneously held as shown
144 Kay and J 295 ai. (1628).
21 Columbia Law Review 680.
-12 177 Ill. 468-52 N. D. 1052.
1120 S. CaT. 514.
"176 U. S. 660.
"155 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1889), 85 NT. . 1Q93 (1903), 136 N. E. 224
(1922), also California.
Walshon Equity, note page 200.
Thompson 21 Columbia Law Review 680.
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in earlier cases. Prior Tynemouth,22 Digge's Cases 23 and cases
during the time of James 1.24 were all instances where the King
tried to assert his right of jus privatum in the land between high
and low water mark and made grants to his favorites at court.
All these cases that came before the court were decided for the
upland owner and held the King held such lands only as jus
publicum. It is well known that Charles I in his efforts to get
money, selected courts that would do his bidding and in 1628
the famous Philpot Case2 5 was decided in favor of the Crown.
But this case was reversed not long after the beheading of
Charles.
Attorney General v Richards,26 was the first case we have
where an injunction was issued for a purpresture and a public
nuisance. This was on an obstruction in the bay which inter-
fered with the commerce and navigation to a town. Richards
claimed title to the land which was disapproved and the court
held the obstruction to be a public nuisance, and said "when
the King claims and proves title to the soil where a purpresture
and a public nuisance have been committed he will have a decree
to abate it."
Other injunctions followed to enjoin purprestures which
were public nisances rather quickly Attorney General v Par-
meter,27 Attorney General v Johnson,28 and Attorney General v.
Burridge,2 9 were all cases of obstructions in navigable waters
which were interfering with commerce and public navigation
and, as such, were public nuisances. From this it is seen that
equity had expanded its jurisdiction to all purprestures which
were public nuisances.
Purprestures not only applied to navigable waters but also
to highways, streets or any publicly owned ground. Any
obstruction of or encroachment on any highway or street is made
a public nuisance per se by statute in most states whether they
interfere with public traffic or not and will be enjoined by courts
OCoram Rege 20 Edw. I roll 58 (1292).
2'Anderson p. 86.2,Atty. Gen. v. Biggs and Atty. Gen. v. Stephens Exch. B & A.
Southton Chas. I, 42.
2 Supra, note 14.
-OAnstruther 603 (1795).
10 Priee 378 (1811).
2 Wils Ch. 87 (119).
10 Price 350 (1822).
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of equity One instance may be cited where a bay window
wich extended into the street about nine feet -and did not inter-
fere with the traveling public was declared a public nuisance.
A statute declared a nuisance and ordered the removal of any
obstruction in the street or anything that tended to narrow it.
"The bay window does not obstruct travel but it does tend to
narrow the street, therefore, it is a nuisance and injunction
issues", was the ruling of the court in State v. Kean.30 Another
instance is the First National Bank of Montgomery v Tyson,31
where a bank, in building, had put its pillars out twenty-two
inches on the side walk and it was declared a purpresture and
public nuisance. The court said "a building or like structure
erected on a street-winch includes its sidewalks-without sanc-
tion of the legislature is a nusance, that public highways belong
from side to side and from end to end to the public, and they are
entitled to a free passage along any portion of it, not in use by
some other traveler, and there can be no permanent use of the
way for private purposes" So many cases are on record that
there need be no more cited here.
3 2
The above cases show that equity has used the injunction to
abate public nuisances which are purely criminal and to enforce
criminal statutes. A still further use of the injunction to
enforce the cruinal statutes occurs where injunctions are issued
in situations analogous to purprestures.
In Attorney General v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corpora-
tion,33 the defendant company had a franchise to furnish water
to the city They obtained their water from a public pond aiid
the city council passed an ordinance against the company draw-
ing the water from the pond below a certain level. The demand
exceeded the supply of water and the company was about to
draw the water below the level set out in the ordinance. The
court was asked to enjoin the company from drawing more water
from the pond. The injunction was issued, and the court said
it was a purpresture and a public nuisance. The public had a
right to boating and fishing in the pond. A property right
vested in the State and a lowering of the water was an encroach-
45 At. 256 (1897).
32 So. 144 (1902).
For further citations see Ames Cases in Equity, note p. 618.
3133 Mass. 361 (1882).
K. L. J.-6
KENTUCKY LAw JouNA
ment upon that right, and it was a public nuisance in that mud
and slime would be left on the banks.
The same type of reasomng was used in Attorney General
v Willdams.3 4 An injunction was issued against the erection
of a building above a certain height, as prescribed by city ordi-
nance on Copley Square, Boston. The court said, "we hold
that the statute gives rights in the nature of an easement over
lands facing Copley Square, which easement is annexed to the
Square for the benefit of the public for whose benefit Copley
Square was laid out, and that these rights are similar in' their
nature to rights m highways, in great ponds and navigable
waters of the Commonwealth. It is a purpredture
winch is in the nature of a public nuisance, and m
equity is to be dealt with as a public nuisance"
A still further extension of purpresture is found in Georgza
v Tennessee Copper Compavy.355  This was a suit instituted by
the State of Georgia to enjoin a factory in an adjoimng state
from letting loose obnoxious and poisonous gases which were
causing great damage to property and inhabitants of Georgia.
Five counties were affected. The injunction issued and the
reasomng was analagous to that of purpresture. The Court
said, "every state in such a case has a quasi sovereignty and as
such has a right to demand that the air over its territory be free
from obnoxious fumes 'and pure for the use of its citizens"
'Where the state is proceeding, it can go ahead on the purpresture
rule or public nuisance, or both.
This ease infers that the State could also base its jurisdic-
tion on public health and safety and enjoin the nuisance, which
.brings us to discuss the jurisdiction of equity to protect the
health and safety of the public.
III. EXTENSION OF'EQUITY JURISDICTION TO PiROTECTION OF
HEALT AND SAFETY.
As early as the 13th century, the health and safety of the
people were protected by the courts. A writ of prohibition was
issued to close a market3 6 because of unwholesome food.
3174 Mass. 476 (1899).
- 206 U. S. 230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618 (1909).
11 Bracton's Note Book Case (1162).
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Another instance is given where an open ditch,37 dangerous to
the traveling public, was ordered closed. These writs of prolu-
bition were analogous to perpetual or interlocutory injunctions
as issued by equity today 38
The first case where an injunction was issued to abate a
public nuisance was Bond's Case. 30 The Queen held a reversion
against a tenant who was erecting a pigeon house. The pigeon
house was declared a common nuisance and abated. What was
equity's basis for jurisdiction9 There is no property right men-
tioned.
To abate a pigeon house must have been a protection of
public health. It was shown above that the Crown had a prop-
erty right in its subjects and, finding no mention made of any
basis for jurisdiction, we assume the basis to have been founded
on this property right in the Crown.
During the reign of Charles I, equity lost a great part of its
power and not until near the 19th century do we hear of the
injunction being issued to abate public nusances. The courts
were slow in exercising their rights but, soon after it once began
to assert its rights and powers, it grew rapidly
The jurisdiction of equity in public nuisance cases to pro-
tect health and safety was well established early, as shown by
Anonymous Case, 40 and Batnes v Baker 41 Both of these cases
dealt with small-pox hospitals. Although injunctions did not
issue, Lord ilardwicke, while sitting in equity, says that in the
case of public nuisances, an injunction by the Attorney General
is a proper remedy The first case was not- proved a public
nuisance and the second case was brought by the wrong party
In the case of the London Corporation v Bolt,42 an injunc-
tion was issued on the petition by the mayor to enjoin the defend-
ant from using old houses to store sugar. Two of the houses had
fallen under the weight and the others were a menace to the
passersby The court declared it a niusance endangering lives
but was slow in issuing the injunction, saying the mayor had a
more effectual remedy That equity was reluctant to enjoin a
" Bracton's Note Book Case (1253).
28 Holsworth History of Law, Vol. II, p. 248.
238 Moore No. 372 (1587).
3 Atk. 750 (1740).
- 1 Amb. 158 (1752).
"5 Ves. 129 (1799).
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public nuisance is shown by Lord Eldon's refusing an injunc-
tion in the case of Attorney General v Cleaver 43 This was on
information against an offensive soap factory, a proven public
nuisance, but later Lord Eldon issued other injunctions -gainst
public nuisances and distinguisbed this case as barred by laches.
The same reluctance to grant injunctions in public nuisance
cases in the United States is shown when Kent, C., refused an
injunction in Attorney General v Utica Insurance Company.
4
However, equity after this time advanced rather rapidly
In Crowder v Tinkler,45 an injunction issued to remove a build-
ing used for storing gunpowder. The court said that where it
was a public nuisance at the suit of the Attorney General, equity
had jurisdiction. In Attorney General v Hunter,46 an injunc-
tion issued to prevent an erection of a milldam near the State
Capitol because it was a public nuisance injurious to health.
The courts were not long in expanding its jurisdiction and in
Attorney General v Steward and Taylor4 the court said, "any
trade or business, however lawful, which from the place or
manner it is carried on materially injures the property of others,
or effects their health, or renders the enjoyment of life physically
uncomfortable is a nuisance which it is the duty of this court
to restrain." Other cases where equity has enjoined public
nuisances injurious to health and safety are cited in the notes.48
Further advancement by courts of equity to restrain crine
assume jurisdiction where the remedy at law may be adequate
is found in Wolcott v DoreMus.49 Here the court says, "where
it is shown that the safety of users of a highway is imperiled by
shooting on premises of a gun club at targets by members of
the club, a public nuisance exists and it is the duty of the court
to protect the public from injurv by injunction regardless of
what ever remedy there may be to enforce abatement."
We have seen that equity will issue an injunction to protect
public health and safety where a public nuisance has been
threatened or is being committed. A further extension of
18 Ves. 210 (1811).
412 Johns. Ch. 371 (1817)
4-119 Yes. 617 (1816).
4016 N. Car. 12 (1826).
4720 N. J. Eq. 415 (1869).
42 Minn. 342; 58 N. J. Eq. 171, 66 Califorma 138; 82 Mich. 471,
99 N. Y. 237
43 101 AtI. 868 (1917).
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equity crninal jurisdiction occurs where zoning ordinance have
been enforced.
These cases are somewhat analogous to health and safety in
that the enjoyment of one's residential property should not be
disturbed by business enterprises. Such disturbance constitutes
a nuisance and equity may take jurisdiction. But the case also
goes so far as to say it is a nuisance "if for no other reason, it is
an example of defiance of the municipal government?' 5
CONC LUSION
There can be no doubt that the injunction has been used
extensively to prevent the commission of crimes from an early
period, but in no instance has it assumed jurisdiction to prevent
crimes.as such.5 1 The principle underlying the ease is that the
government may enjoin certain acts winch amount to a crime or
a violation of the criminal statutes, not because the act com-
plained of is a crime, but in spite of the fact that it is a crime.
Equity jurisdiction has so grown until today most crimes
can be adjudged public nusances. The rapid advancement of
civilization has far outdistanced the ponderous and unwieldy
machinery of the law courts, and equity, like the supplement it
is, has tried to keep apace. Will we in this mad race speed up
the criminal courts of law or have a "'government by injunc-
tion " 7
F H. HANKxS.
0 New Orleans v. Liberty S7hOp, 157 La. 26.
51101 So. 799, 40 A. Li. R. 1136 and Annotatoins.
